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The U.S. agricultural labor market is heavily dependent on foreign-born workers. 
According to the 2002 National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) report, 77 percent 
of agricultural workers were foreign-born for the years 2001-02 (Carroll et al. 2005). 
Approximately 69 percent of these foreign-born workers lacked authorization to work in 
the U.S.  Hence, 53 percent of all farm workers were undocumented for the same period 
(Carroll et al. 2005), making U.S. agriculture one of the most undocumented-worker-
intensive industries.  
Political and national interest in immigration reform rose sharply over the last few 
years, resulting in the introduction of two bills – somewhat diametrically opposed – in the 
109
th U.S. Congress.  For example, in December 2005 the U.S. House of Representatives 
passed H.R. 4437 which is considerably stricter on enforcement than the recent Senate 
immigration bill (S. 2611) which favors legalization and guest worker programs for 
undocumented immigrant workers
1.  Given the high proportion of unauthorized workers 
in the agricultural labor force, farm employers are concerned that labor availability and 
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1 HR. 4437 (the Border Protection, Antiterrorism & Illegal Immigration Act of 2005) and the S. 2611 
(Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006) disagree sharply on how undocumented immigrants 
should be dealt with by law.     
 
  1cost may be adversely affected if certain reforms are passed, and specifically if they are 
more stringently applied across the board (Walters et al. 2006). 
Not surprisingly, the debate that has ensued on immigration reform and its 
implications for agriculture is quite similar to that which preceded the passage of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986.  In order to discourage the 
employment of unauthorized immigrant labor in the U.S, several measures were 
implemented.  These included employer sanctions, a supplemental guest worker program, 
modification of the H-2 program, and legalization of unauthorized workers.   
Approximately 1.3 million unauthorized farm workers were granted legal status and 
many farmers and politicians were concerned about the effect on U.S. agriculture. Their 
prediction was that undocumented agricultural workers who received amnesty would 
leave agriculture for other employment opportunities, and this would lead to serious labor 
shortages and wage increases in US agriculture (Tran and Perloff 2002). These 
predictions did not materialize since the employment of unauthorized workers in U.S. 
agriculture has increased over time.  This increase in undocumented workers seems to 
suggest that IRCA has not been as effective as lawmakers had intended
2.   
However, there is no generally-accepted interpretation on why this considerable 
increase in composition of unauthorized workers occurred in U.S. agriculture after the 
IRCA. This phenomenon is even puzzling since existing literature generally concludes 
that legal status tends to lengthen the duration of a worker staying in farm work. There 
are two representative methods in the empirical study of the relationship between legal 
                                                 
2 The proportion of unauthorized workers in U.S. agriculture has risen from 7% in 1989 to 32% for the 
years 1994-95, and 53% in 2001-02 (Mines et al. 1997, Carroll et al. 2005). 
  2status and likelihood of a worker staying in U.S. agriculture in the post IRCA period: 
duration model and Markov chain model.  
Hashida and Perloff (1996), Emerson and Napasintuwong (2002), and Iwai et al. 
(2005) use duration model to estimate the length of a farm work spell for given 
characteristics of a farm worker. Although the duration model may yield a rather accurate 
estimate for the length of each farm work spell, the problem of the methodology, 
however, is that it does not deal with the frequency of farm work spells.
3 Since farm 
workers are generally migratory and frequently move in and out of U.S. agriculture 
(Emerson 1989, Perloff et al. 1998, Tran and Perloff 2002), in order to adequately 
estimate the likelihood of a worker staying in U.S. agriculture, the estimation method 
should take into consideration the frequency of each type of spell (typically, farm work, 
non-farm work, and other activity) as well as the length of each spell.  Tran and Perloff 
(2002) estimate a stationary, first-order Markov chain model of employment turnover 
(Amemiya 1985), and calculate the steady-state probability for each demographic group 
to work in US agriculture. The Tran and Perloff implementation of the Markov chain 
model has an obvious advantage over the duration model since the former considers 
frequency of farm work spells as well as length of each spell.  
This paper extends the Tran and Perloff Markov chain model to incorporate 
sample selectivity issues. Each type of spell for a worker with a legal status is observed 
only if the worker is in that legal status. Each foreign-born worker chooses his/her legal 
status, considering conditions such as observable and unobservable individual 
characteristics, cost of application, and benefit of the status. If the legal-status and 
                                                 
3 Estimated duration may reflect the length of contract for each legal status worker rather than likelihood of 
staying in US agriculture. 
  3employment-status selection are correlated, the Markov chain model may yield biased 
estimators without correcting for the legal-status selection process. Regarding this, both 
Hashida and Perloff (1996) and Iwai et al. (2005) point out the serious sample selection 
bias problem in their duration models.
4 In order to compensate for the problems in the 
two representative methods above, it may be necessary to develop and estimate a Markov 
chain model with correction for sample selection bias. 
We have the following three objectives in the current study. We propose a 
stationary, first-order Markov chain model with selection bias correction to adequately 
estimate the likelihood of each legal status worker staying in U.S. agriculture. Second, we 
extend our sample of the NAWS data up to 2004. The data sample (1989-91) used by 
Tran and Perloff is in a transitional period in the sense that newly legalized workers 
under IRCA may not have had enough time to move to other industries. Third, we 
implement a simulation to investigate how the likelihood of a typical unauthorized 
worker would be expected to change with a change in legal status.   
 
Methodology 
In this section we present the estimation method for legal status selection and 
turnover between employment statuses for workers. First, we introduce the probit model 
to explain legal status selection for workers, and then first-order Markov chain model to 
explain the turnover between employment statuses for each legal status workers. Next, 
we present an estimation method to deal with the possible sample selection bias in the 
                                                 
4 Hashida and Perloff (1996) correct selection bias using Lee’s extension of Heckman’s two-stage sample 
selection method (Lee 1983). Iwai et al. (2005) use a Heckman type two-stage method with the ordered 
probit model in the first stage. 
 
  4Markov model. Finally, we introduce several statistical tests which investigate whether 
there is a sample selection bias or not.   
There are three legal statuses for a farm worker: 0=foreign-born unauthorized, 
1=foreign-born authorized, and 2=US-born citizen worker. A foreign-born worker’s legal 
status (Ji) takes on two values, 0 or 1, while a US-born worker’s legal status is fixed at 2 
so that there is no selection problem for the latter. The probit model is used to explain the 
legal status of a foreign-born worker as a function of the individuals’ demographic and 
policy variables.
5 With the familiar argument of latent regression (Greene 2003), we can 
assume that an unobserved variable Ji
* is censored as follows: 
. 0   if      1










where  ; x i i i x J ε α + = '
*
i is a vector of exogenous characteristics of individual i; and εi is a 
disturbance term. The characteristics include gender, marital status, English speaking 
ability, race (black, white, or other), ethnicity (Hispanic or other), age, age squared, 
education, education squared, US farm experience, US farm experience squared, presence 
of relatives or close friends in US non-farm work, and the year of interview (before 1993, 
after 2001, or in-between).
6 Following the probit model assumption,  i ε  is  normally 
distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of  ε σ . Then the likelihood 
function can be expressed as 
                                                 
5 Isé and Perloff (1995) use multinomial logit, while Iwai et al. (2005) use ordered probit for legal status 
selection model. We use the standard probit model assuming there are only two statuses (unauthorized or 
authroized) for foreign-born workers, so that we can correct selection bias in the Markov model.  
6 The intent of these dummy variables is to test the effects of immigration policy change. The Before 1993 
dummy corresponds to the period just after IRCA; the After 2001 dummy corresponds to the period 
following September 11, 2001. 
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where    indicates the cumulative distribution for the standard normal. Note one 
restriction in the above model that legal status for a worker is not transitional. This is 
because NAWS data do not track the legal status change for each worker; it only records 
legal status at the time of interview.  However, the only period in which there is likely to 
have been a change in legal status during the recorded work history is following IRCA.  
But since the NAWS data start in 1989, most applications and decisions had been made 
by then.  Consequently, we would expect very few legal status transitions by workers 
over the sample period. 
) (⋅ Φ
Next, we present the first-order Markov chain model to explain the migration of a 
worker between activities. Suppose that   is the indicator of employment state for 
worker i in period t such that   if person i is actively working in US agriculture in 
period t,
) (t yi
1 ) ( = t yi
7 and   if the person i is in other activities in period t. 0 ) ( = t yi
8 We assume that 
the employment state of a person follows a stationary, first-order Markov process. 
Following the standard Markov chain model (Amemiya 1985), the transition of 
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7 In our estimation one period is two months so that each worker’s status is recorded every other month. 
8 We use the two-state model (in U.S. agriculture or in other activities) for the following reasons. First, our 
focus of the current study is U.S. agriculture. Second, there are many spells without specific activities for 
which all we know is that the worker is not in U.S. agriculture.  Other activities include working in non-
agricultural industries, unemployed, and out of the country. 
  6  0 )) ( ) ( ( = s u t u E i i for t≠s. Independent variables zi include gender, marital status, English 
speaking ability, ethnicity (Hispanic, or other), age, age squared, education, education 
squared, US farm experience, US farm experience squared, region (California, Florida, or 
other), availability of free housing, contract type (seasonal, or year-around basis), task 
(skilled, or unskilled task), payment type (piece rate payment, or other), employer type 
(labor contractor, or grower), presence of relatives or close friends in US non-farm work, 
and the year of the spell (before 1993, after 2001, or in-between). Then the conditional 
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Next we investigate the possible correlation between legal-status and employment-status 
selection. Since correlation between    may lead to biased and inconsistent 
estimates in equation (2), we should at least test the possible correlation between them. 
Assuming they are bivariately normally distributed with correlation coefficient ρ, the 
joint probability of the state variable being 1 and legal status 0 in period t is given as  
and ( ) ii ut ε
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Further assuming that β, γ, ρ and σ depend on j, the above probability may be written as 
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where  ) ( 2 ⋅ Φ   indicates the cumulative distribution for the bivariate standard normal. 
Since NAWS data record only one legal status for each worker, the equation above 
on orker. Hence, the above 
equation is similar to the case of the worker-specific unobser
0 2 ⎟ ⎜ i i
assum there is no transiti  between legal statuses for a w
ved heterogeneity which is 
constant over time (Fougere and Kamionka 2005).  We denote 
es that 
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~
) 1 ( | , 0 ) ( t P t y j t y P ij i i = − = hereafter. Using these 
notations, three other joint probabilities are given as 
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Note that the likelihood function for US-born citizen workers is simply given as 
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  8equation (2) since they do not have the legal-status-selection problem. Next, we introduce 
tests for existence of sample selection bias in the above estimation. That is, we test 
whether the ρj’s are significantly different from zero. The simplest test is checking t-
statistics for each ρj. The problem with this method is that there are many inconclusive 
cases since it is possible to have a different test result for each ρj. More systematic test 
methods are the likelihood ratio (LR) test and Wald test. It can be shown that maximizing 
equation (7) is the identical problem as maximizing equation (1) for legal status 0 and 1, 
and equation (2) separately for each legal status, if there is no sample selection bias (ρj=0 
for j=0 and 1). Then the large sample distribution of -2*lnλ, where λ is the likelihood 
ratio of restricted over unrestricted maximum likelihood, follows a chi-square distribution 
ith degrees of freedom of 2. While the LR test requires both unrestricted and restricted 
maximum likelihood estimators, the Wal ator. 
These t
w
d test requires only the unrestricted estim
ests are standard, and we follow the formulas in Greene (2003). 
 
Data 
The data used in this study are obtained from the National Agricultural Workers Survey 
(NAWS) (U.S. Department of Labor  2006). The survey reports each worker’s work-history for 
three years at maximum preceding the date of interview. We used the study period from 1989, 
when the NAWS was first available, to the most recent year available, 2004, with sample size of 
40,650 
                                                
workers.
9 We record the employment status (in US agriculture or in other activities) of 
each worker every other month for three years at maximum. Next we describe the definitions of 
each variable used in the model below. 
Legal status is a discrete variable ranging from 0 to 2. A foreign born worker must fall 
 
9 This sample size is much larger than 1,538 in Tran and Perloff (2002). 
  9into status 0 or 1. Status 0 = “unauthorized” worker means that the worker is undocumented (did 
not apply to any legal status or application was denied) and also includes one who had no work 
authorization even if he is documented. Status 1 = “authorized” worker includes naturalized 
citizen, 
). Skilled Task is a dummy for 
workers
employer. It does not include those 
who ow
green card holder and work authorization holder; the work authorization may fall into any 
of the following: border crossing card/commuter card, pending status, or temporary resident 
status with a non-immigrant visa. The US-born citizen has status 2 = “citizen” by birth. 
The variable English measures the capability to speak English. The variable is a discrete 
variable ranging from 1 to 4, where 1 = not speaking English at all, 2 = speak a little English, 3 = 
somewhat able to speak English, and 4 = speaking English well. Hispanic is a dummy variable 
for Hispanic which includes Mexican-American, Mexican, Chicano, Puerto Rican, and other 
Hispanic ethnic groups. Black (or African American) and White are also dummy variables derived 
from a question regarding their race which may also be American Indian/Alaka Native, 
Indigenous, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, or others. Age was calculated from the 
difference between the beginning date of spell and the date of birth. Education is the highest 
grade level for education, and it ranges from 0 to 20. Experience is the number of years of doing 
farm work in the US (not including farm work experience abroad
 who engage in semi-skilled or supervisory tasks. Although the original questions have 
over 100 task codes, tasks are grouped into six categories as follows: 1 = pre-harvest, 2 = harvest, 
3 = post-harvest, 4 = semi-skilled, 5 = supervisor, and 6 = other.  
Seasonal Worker is a dummy for workers who were working on a seasonal basis for the 
employer. Piece rate is a dummy for workers who are paid by piece rate instead of being paid by 
the hour or a salary. Labor contractor is a dummy variable for workers who are employed by 
labor contractors rather than the grower. Free housing is a dummy variable for workers (or 
workers and their family) who receive free housing from their 
n their house or live for free with friends or relatives. It also excludes those who pay for 
housing provided by employers or by the government or charity. Relative is a dummy for workers 
  10who have relatives or close friends in US non-farm work. 
The dummies for Florida and California are the location of the employment. Before 1993 
dummy variable is for all the years p  majority of IRCA legalization was 
granted
rior to 1993 when the
, and After 2001 is the years post-September 11, 2001 event.   
 
Empirical Results 
For legal status 0 and 1 workers, we estimated the Markov chain model with self-
selectivity using the Newton-Raphson method with the maximum likelihood function 
iven as equation (7).
10  Since status 2 workers (citizens by birth), do not have the legal-
, we simply estimated equation (2) for this group using the same 
method
 Using a 0.05 significance cr
find that all coefficients are statistically significant. The third column of Table 1 shows 
the marginal effect of each variable on the probability of a worker being legal. The 





Legal status selection 
The estimates for legal-status-selection parameters in equation (7) and their 
asymptotic standard errors are reported in table 1. iterion, we 
* Prob( 0) 1 ( ' ) ii Jx α >= − Φ − . Then the 
marginal effect of variable k evaluated at the mean x  is  k x α α φ ) ' (−  for the continuous 
variables and  ) ' ( ) ' ( k k k k k x x α α α − − Φ − − Φ les, where  − − − − for the dummy variab k −
k −
x'a n d  
α   are variables and coefficients excluding the k . Females, married, workers with 
higher English speaking ability, black, white, non-hispanic, with a relative in the US non-
th
                                                 
10 We calculated gradient vector and Hessian matrix for logarithm of equation (7). 
  11agricultural sector are statistically significantly more likely to have legal status all else 
being the same. We also find that age, education and US farm experience have a 
significant nonlinear effect on legal status. All three are positive almost throughout the 
relevant range: US farm experience has a positive effect on legal status up to 34 years; 
education has a positive effect on legal status up to 18 years, and age has a positive effect 
on legal status up to 55 years. We find that the greatest positive marginal effect is from 
the Before 1993 dummy followed by Female dummy and English speaking ability. The 
greatest negative marginal effect is from the Hispanic dummy followed by the After 2001 
dummy
ose emp
atus table. A worker is 
predicted to be status 0 (unauthorized) if 
. Note that, holding all other characteristics the same, the workers employed 
before 1993 are 34% more likely and those interviewed after 2001 are 9% less likely to 
be legal compared to th loyed between these periods. 
Finally, Table 2 shows the actual-predicted legal st
0 ' ˆ < i x α , and is predicted to be status 1 
(authorized) worker if 0 ' ˆ > i x α . Table 2 shows that 76% of unauthorized, and 84% of 
authori
rentheses)
the coefficients on the selectivity variables 
zed workers are correctly predicted in their legal status. 
 
Employment state transition 
The estimates for employment-state-transition parameters in equation (7) and 
their asymptotic standard errors (given in the pa
 are reported in tables 3 and 4. 
Status 0 (unauthorized) workers have 85,556 spells; status 1 (authorized) workers have 
101,132 spells. Based on asymptotic standard errors using a 0.05 significance criterion, 
0 ρ and  1 ρ   are both highly significantly 
  12negative.
11 We have the same conclusion using LR test and Wald test. We have the 
computed log likelihood ratio of 16.642 and Wald statistics of 34.443 both of which are 
larger than the critical value of 5.991 with 2 degree of freedom at 5 % level of 
significance. That is, using maximum likelihood estimator for equation (2) for each legal 
status 
alifornia, Florida, Skilled task worker (in agriculture) and After 2001 
                                                
without correcting for self-selectivity would lead to bias in estimates for both 
unauthorized and authorized workers.  
Table 3 presents the employment transition parameters and asymptotic standard 
errors for legal status 0 (unauthorized) and legal status 1 (authorized) worker given 
previous state is “not in US agriculture”. This corresponds to estimate of  0 β in equation 
(3) and (4) for status 0 and  1 β in equation (5) and (6) for status 1 worker. A positive 
estimate means that it has a positive effect on the probability of being in US agriculture 
given the previous state is not in US agriculture. We find that most of the estimates are 
statistically significant and have the same sign for both legal statuses, except for a few 
variables such as seasonal worker dummy and Before 1993 dummy. The former has 
negative effect for authorized worker, but no significant effect for unauthorized worker, 
while Before 1993 dummy has negative effect for unauthorized worker but no significant 
effect for authorized worker. Females, married, workers with higher English speaking 
ability, with free-housing, employed by labor contractors are statistically significantly 
less likely to be into agriculture from other employment state, all else being the same. On 
the other hand, C
 
11 The negative correlation between  i ε  and  does not mean that selection bias has negative effect on 
probability of being in US agriculture. This is especially true for the case of legal status 0 worker for whom 
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  13dummy
argest for the Hispanic dummy 
followe
 asympto
errors for each legal status worker given the previous state is “in US agriculture”. This is 
calculated from in equations (3) and (4) for status 0 and  in equations 
 have significantly positive effect on probability of being into agriculture, all else 
being the same.  
The third and fifth columns in table 3 show the marginal effects of each variable 
on the joint probability of being in the respective legal status and in US agriculture. This 
joint probability is given as equation (3) for unauthorized worker and equation (5) for 
authorized worker. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of independent variables 
for each legal status worker. Note that the marginal effects of some variables have 
opposite signs to the partial effect on being in US agriculture, which is given as the 
estimated coefficient. These variables are Marital status, Relative dummy and English 
speaking ability for authorized workers, and Hispanic dummy for unauthorized workers. 
All these variables have a very strong effect on being in the respective legal status, 
especially the Marital status dummy and English speaking ability on being authorized, 
and the Hispanic dummy on being an unauthorized worker. Although these variables 
have a negative effect on being in US agriculture, the positive effect on the legal status 
must dominate. As for the magnitude of the marginal effect for unauthorized workers, the 
negative effect is largest for Before 1993 dummy followed by the Marital status dummy, 
while the positive effect is largest for the California dummy followed by the After 2001 
dummy. For authorized workers, the negative effect is l
d by the Labor contractor dummy, while the positive effect is largest for the  
Before 1993 dummy followed by the California dummy. 
Table 4 shows the employment transition parameters and tic standard 
  ) ˆ ˆ ( 0 0 γ β + ) ˆ ˆ ( 1 1 γ β +
  14(5) and (6) for status 1 workers.
12 A positive estimate means that it has a positive effect 
on the probability of being in US agriculture given the previous state is in US agriculture. 
We find that most of the estimates are statistically significant and have the same sign for 
both legal statuses, except for a few variables. For example, English speaking ability has 
no significant effect for either legal status worker, while Marital status dummy has a 
negative effect for unauthorized, and the Hispanic dummy has a positive effect for 
authorized workers, but no significant effect on the other. Both Labor contractor and the 
Piece rate payment dummies have negative effects for authorized workers, but no 
significant effect for unauthorized workers. 
 Other than these variables, females, seasonal workers with a relative in US non-
agriculture sector, with free-housing, in California, before 1993 are statistically 
significantly less likely to stay in US agriculture, all else being the same. Note also that 
education has a negative effect on staying in US agriculture at the mean for both legal 
statuses.
13 On the other hand, Florida, After 2001, and Skilled task worker (in agriculture) 
dummies have significantly positive effects, all else being the same.  
The third and fifth columns in table 4 show the marginal effects of each variable 
on the joint probability of being in the respective legal status and remaining in US 
agriculture. This joint probability is given as equation (3) for the unauthorized worker 
and equation (5) for the authorized worker. Again, marginal effects of some variables 
have opposite signs to the partial effect on being in US agriculture, given as the estimated 
coefficient. This happens only for authorized workers. These variables are Female, 
                                                 
12 We also used the following formula to calculate estimate for variance and standard errors: 
Est. .  ) γ , β ( *Est. ) γ ( Est. ) β ( Est. ) γ β ( j j j j j j ˆ ˆ cov 2 ˆ var ˆ var ˆ ˆ var + + = +
  15Marital status, Relative and Before 1993 dummy and Education, all of which have very 
strong positive effects on being in an authorized legal status. Although these variables 
have negative effects on staying in US agriculture, the positive effects on the legal status 
must dominate. Also, strong negative effects on legal status of Hispanic and After 2001 
dummies dominate the positive effect on staying in US agriculture. 
As for the magnitude of the marginal effect for unauthorized workers, the 
negative effect is largest from the Before1993 dummy followed by the Female dummy, 
while the positive effect is largest from the Hispanic dummy followed by the Florida 
dummy. For authorized workers, the negative effect is largest from the Seasonal worker 
dummy followed by the Hispanic dummy, while the positive effect is largest from the 
Before1993 dummy followed by the Florida dummy. Before 1993, it is almost 30% less 
likely to remain in US agriculture with an unauthorized worker status, and 23% more 
likely to remain in US agriculture with an authorized worker status, all else being the 
same. 
Finally table 5 shows the estimates and their asymptotic standard errors for the 
Markov chain model for US-born citizen workers. Here we estimated equation (2) using 
the maximum likelihood method. We also calculated the marginal effect on the 
probability of being in US agriculture at the mean of independent variables. We find the 
strongest negative effect on moving into agriculture is from the Labor contractor and 
Before 1993 dummies, and the strongest positive effect is from the After 2001 dummy 
followed by the California dummy. The strongest negative effect on staying in US 
agriculture is from the Seasonal worker dummy followed by Free housing and Relative 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 Education has negative effect up to 8.6 years for unauthorized workers and 6.5 years for authorized 
  16dummy, and the strongest positive effect is from the Florida dummy followed by the 
Skilled task worker (in agriculture) dummy. 
 
Transition and Steady State Probability 
In this section we estimate the transition and steady state probability of 
employment state given the legal status of workers. The probability of being in US 
agriculture conditional on unauthorized status is given as 
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Then, the conditional transition matrix, we denote Pj, for unauthorized workers has the 
following form: 
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In this matrix the upper left element is the probability of being “in US agriculture” given 
that his/her legal status is unauthorized and previous employment state is “in US 
agriculture”. The upper right element is the probability of being “not in US agriculture” 
given that his/her legal status is unauthorized and previous employment state is “in US 
agriculture”. Also note that sum of these equals one. The second row corresponds to the 
case that the previous employment state is “not in US agriculture”. So, other than the 
                                                                                                                                                 
workers, while their mean education length is 6.02 and 5.64 years respectively. 
  17condition on legal status, this is the same as the standard transition matrix for Markov 
processes. We can calculate the conditional transition matrix for authorized workers the 
same way, but the transition matrix for the US-born citizen worker is not conditioned on 
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Table 6 presents the transition matrix of employment turnover, P0, P1 and P2, estimated at 
the mean of the independent variables for each legal status worker. For the first two legal 
status workers, the transitional probabilities are conditional on legal status. We find that 
there is not much difference between legal statuses for the probability of staying in US 
agriculture, although unauthorized workers have the highest probability of 90%. However, 
legal status 1 (authorized) workers have a substantially lower probability of staying in the 
“not in US agriculture” state with a probability of 59%.  In addition, authorized (legal 
status 1) workers have greater transition mobility between agricultural employment and 
being out of agriculture than do unauthorized (legal status 0) workers. 
Using these transition matrices we calculate the steady state probability of 
employment status for each legal status worker. Following Amemiya (1985), the  steady 
state probability vector for each worker  )) (   denoted ( ∞ j p  is  calculated  as 
 for each j. Table 7 shows the steady state probability of each worker in 
two employment states. According to this, unauthorized workers have the highest steady 
state probability of “being in US agriculture” with 77%, followed by authorized workers 
[] ()
∞ = ∞ ' 1 1 ) ( j j P p
  18with 75% and by US-born citizen workers with 73%. However, the difference between 
legal statuses is very small. 
 
Simulation Study 
In this section we implement simulations to examine how the steady state probability 
of a typical unauthorized worker staying in US agriculture would be expected to change 
with a change in legal status. This approach isolates the effect of legal status of the 
worker from differing observable characteristics of workers by holding the characteristics 
constant across varying legal status. In addition, we vary the time period (before or after 
2001
14), the type of worker (seasonal or non-seasonal), the skill level (skilled or non-
skilled), the type of employer (grower or labor contractor), and the location (California or 
other states of the U.S.
15). We fix each continuous variable at the mean of unauthorized 
worker observations, and fix each remaining discrete variable at the category with the 
maximum number of observations of unauthorized workers. The profile of the “typical” 
unauthorized worker is illustrated in Table 8.  
As before, the conditional probability of being in US agriculture for unauthorized 
status workers is given as equation (8). When the legal status of unauthorized worker i is 
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Note that the condition in the square brackets is retained, since it formulates the 
                                                 
14 Before 2001 means years from 1993 to 2001. 
15 Other states of the U.S. does not include Florida. 
  19unobservable characteristics for legal status selection of the worker i.
16 In the same way 
we calculate the conditional probabilities for the other three elements in the transition 
matrix, then calculate the steady state probability in US agriculture. Finally, we calculate 
the change in the steady state probability from this legal status conversion. 
The results are shown in Table 9. For 27 out of 32 cases, unauthorized workers 
working as “legal” workers would have a higher steady state probability in US 
agriculture than when working as unauthorized workers. If we focus on before 1993 cases, 
in all 16 cases, legal status would increase the steady state probability in US agriculture, 
but the magnitude of the change is not large. The highest increase is for seasonal, 
unskilled workers employed by growers not in California with a 7.3% point increase. 
There are only four cases with changes greater than 5% points, all of which occur for 
workers employed by growers. These five cases tend to be unskilled (with one exception) 
and seasonal workers (with one exception). 
There are five cases after 2001 in which legal status would decrease the steady 
state probability in US agriculture. Interestingly, all of these cases are for workers 
employed by labor contractors. However, the largest decrease is only 1.1% point for 
seasonal, skilled workers employed by labor contractors in California. Overall, we could 
say that the change in the steady state probability from legal status conversion is very 
small after 2001; none of the 16 cases is over 5% points in absolute value. 
 
Conclusion 
We have proposed and estimated a stationary, first-order Markov chain model 
with selection bias correction to adequately estimate the likelihood of each legal status 
                                                 
16 See Maddala (1983) for the detailed argument. 
  20worker staying in U.S. agriculture. We used the NAWS data from 1989, when the NAWS 
was first available, to the most recent year available, 2004, with a sample size of 40,650 
workers, and recorded the employment status (in US agriculture or in other activities) of 
each worker every other month for three years at maximum.  
Our maximum likelihood estimation shows statistically significant coefficients on 
the selection bias terms for both authorized and unauthorized workers. Then we corrected 
selection bias in the calculation of transition and steady state probabilities of employment 
turnover. The conditional steady state probability in US agriculture is highest for 
unauthorized workers, but there is not much difference between legal statuses. Also, the 
simulation study shows that a legal status change for unauthorized worker would result in 
only small changes in the steady state probability of being in US agriculture, especially 
after 2001. The dramatic increase in composition of unauthorized workers in US 
agriculture during 1990s remains unexplained since our results find too small a difference 
in employment turnover between legal statuses to explain that phenomenon. The next 
issue is to study the entry into and exit out of US agriculture: what type of worker entered 
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Table 1. Legal-status-selection parameters 
 















































Before 1993  0.901* 
(0.008) 
0.343 








Table 2. Actual-predicted legal status table 
  Predicted Legal Status  Total 
Actual Legal Status  0  1   
0 76%  24% 100% 
1 16%  84% 100% 
 
  22 Table 3. Employment transition parameters when the previous state is “not in US 
agriculture”. 





















































































































* indicates that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at 5 percent level of 
significance.  
  23Table 4. Employment transition parameters when the previous state is “in US 
agriculture”. 





















































































































* indicates that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at 5 percent level of 
significance.  
  24 
Table 5. Markov chain model estimates for US-born citizen workers. 
  Previous state is “not 
in US agriculture” 
Marginal 
Effect 
Previous state is  














































































































  25Table 6. Transition matrix for each legal status worker.  
  Employments state=1  Employments state=0 
Legal status 0   
Previous employment state=1  0.904 0.096 
Previous employment state=0  0.321 0.679 
Legal status 1    
Previous employment state=1  0.860 0.140 
Previous employment state=0  0.410 0.590 
Legal status 2    
Previous employment state=1  0.890 0.110 
Previous employment state=0  0.303 0.697 
Employment state 1 is “in US agriculture” and Employment state 0 is “not in US 
agriculture”. One period is two months. Status 0 and status 1 worker probabilities are 
conditional on legal status. 
 
Table 7. Steady state probability of employment state.  
Legal status 0 
Employment state=1  0.770 
Employment state=0  0.230 
Legal status 1   
Employment state=1  0.746 
Employment state=0  0.254 
Legal status 2   
Employment state=1  0.733 
Employment state=0  0.267 
 
Table 8. Profile of the “Typical” Unauthorized Worker 
Female 0 
Married 0 








Free Housing  0 
Piece Rate  0 




































































Unauthorized Authorized  Change 
No No No No  No    0.773  0.842  0.069 
No No No No Yes    0.807  0.857  0.050 
No No No Yes No    0.764  0.798  0.033 
No No No Yes Yes    0.801  0.821  0.020 
                 
No No  Yes No  No    0.848  0.891  0.044 
No No  Yes No Yes    0.868  0.899  0.031 
No No  Yes Yes No    0.842  0.859  0.017 
No No  Yes Yes Yes    0.865  0.872  0.007 
                 
No Yes No  No  No   0.618  0.691  0.073 
No Yes No  No  Yes    0.670  0.726  0.055 
No Yes No Yes  No   0.604  0.625  0.021 
No Yes No Yes Yes    0.660  0.671  0.010 
                 
No Yes  Yes No  No   0.712  0.768  0.056 
No Yes  Yes No  Yes    0.750  0.791  0.041 
No Yes  Yes Yes  No   0.702  0.712  0.011 
No Yes  Yes Yes Yes    0.743  0.745  0.002 
              
Yes No No  No  No   0.834  0.875  0.041 
Yes No No  No  Yes    0.854  0.884  0.030 
Yes No No Yes  No   0.829  0.839  0.011 
Yes No No Yes Yes    0.851  0.855  0.004 
              
Yes No Yes No  No   0.890  0.914  0.024 
Yes No Yes No  Yes    0.901  0.918  0.017 
Yes No Yes Yes  No   0.888  0.889  0.001 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes    0.900  0.897  -0.003 
              
Yes Yes No  No  No   0.699  0.744  0.045 
Yes Yes No  No  Yes   0.735  0.769  0.034 
Yes Yes No  Yes  No   0.689  0.686  -0.003 
Yes Yes No  Yes  Yes   0.729  0.722  -0.007 
              
Yes Yes Yes  No  No   0.779  0.810  0.032 
Yes Yes Yes  No  Yes   0.802  0.825  0.023 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  No   0.772  0.764  -0.008 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes   0.799  0.787  -0.011 
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